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POLITICS AND THE REHNQUIST COURT'
JAMES F. SIMON**

Jeffrey Toobin in his review of my book in The New Yorker said that
The Center Holds: The Power Struggle Inside the Rehnquist Court'
provided "fascinating" detail of the inner workings of the Rehnquist
Court.2 He also said that I was wrong, dead wrong, in my conclusion
that the center has held.3 He then discussed decisions from last term
which, he conceded, were not decided when my book went to press.
Nonetheless, Toobin concluded those decisions completely undermined my
thesis.
Jeffrey Rosen in his review of my book in the Sunday New York
Times wrote that The Center Holds was "a fine book," "lively and
accessible" and "meticulously researched."' It was, however, his sad
duty to report that I was wrong, at least in the civil rights field, as a result
of last term's conservative decisions.'
Daniel Kornstein in his review of my book in The Baltimore Sun
wrote that The CenterHolds was "a superb book," full of insights into the
working and direction of the Rehnquist Court.' Happily, Kornstein did
not say I was wrong, but he did write that I had put forward a "radical"
view.7
Ladies and gentleman I come here today unrepentant, prepared to
defend my "radical" thesis that there has been no conservative judicial
revolution, even considering the Supreme Court's decisions last term, as
well as the decisions of the previous eight terms that I discussed in my
book.'
When I speak of a conservative revolution, I mean a sudden and
momentous change in the direction of the Court's civil rights and liberties
* Professor Simon delivered these remarks at the Sixth Annual Solomon Lecture at
New York Law School on October 31, 1995.
** Martin Professor of Law, New York Law School.
1.

JAMES F.

SIMON, THE CENTER HOLDS: THE POWER STRUGGLE INSIDE THE

REHNQUIST COURT (1995).
2. Jeffrey Toobin, Chicken Supreme, THE NEW YORKER, Aug. 14, 1995, at 81-82.
3. Id.
4. Jeffrey Rosen, Disorderin the Court, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 1995, §7, at 11.

5. Id.
6. Daniel Kornstein, The Rehnquist Court: High on the Middle Ground,THE BAIT.
SUN, Aug. 29, 1995, at 4F.
7. Id.
8. SIMON, supra note 1.
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decisions such as Chief Justice Rehnquist has been advocating since taking
his seat on the Court in 1972.' Rehnquist's conservative activism is to
be distinguished from the judicial conservatism of, say, Justice John
Marshall Harlan, who emphasized continuity with the Court's past
decisions."0 Rehnquist's conservative vision would severely limit the
protections of civil rights litigants under the Fourteenth Amendment and
civil rights statutes, and, in general, approve governmental authority at the
expense of individual rights.
What is remarkable about the Rehnquist Court, which is led by the
outspoken conservative Chief Justice and whose membership includes
seven appointees of conservative Republican presidents, is that the Justices
have not, in Mr. Dooley's well-worn phrase, "follow[ed] th[e] 'iliction
returns."" Nor have the Justices always done the bidding on the Court
for the presidents who appointed them. In short, there has not been a
wholesale conservative revolution on the Court to match what appears to
be happening in the Congress of the United States.
In fact, most of the decisions of the past three decades that expanded
civil rights and liberties have been preserved. And those that have been
successfully challenged by conservative Rehnquist Court majorities have
usually resulted in the narrowing of liberal precedents rather than outright
reversals.
The key to the Court's philosophical direction is not the conservative
hardliners-Rehnquist, Scalia and Thomas. Rather, the critical battle
continues to be for the minds and votes of the two pivotal Justices,
Anthony Kennedy and Sandra Day O'Connor. They contributed the key
9. See, e.g., Bernard Schwartz, Rehnquist, Runyon, and Jones - The ChiefJustice,
Civil Rights, and StareDecisis, 31 TULSA L.J. 251 (1995) (describing the Chief Justice's
conservative attitude towards civil rights and his attempts to overturn leading civil rights
decisions); Harry M. Clor, Chief Justice Rehnquist and the Balances of Constitutional
Democracy, 25 RuTGERS L.J. 557, 561 (1994) (stating that the Chief Justice seeks to
'restore a balance which, in his view, has been lost or distorted in decades of judicial
activism"); Benno C. Schmidt Jr., The Rehnquist Court:A Watershed, N.Y. TIMEs, June

22, 1986, § 4, at 27 (discussing the "reactionary conservative constitutional" views of,
at the time, newly nominated Chief Justice Rehnquist). Elevated to the position by
President Reagan, Rehnquist became Chief Justice in 1986.
10. See, e.g., Stephen M. Dane, 'OrderedLiberty 'and Self-Restraint: The Judicial
Philosophy of the Second Justice Harlan, 51 U. CIN. L. REV. 545, 562-68

(1982)

(describing Justice Harlan's emphasis on judicial self-restraint, as opposed to favoring
the Court's own preference for a particular public policy, as being essential to sound
judicial administration, the integrity of the judiciary, and the stability of the federal
government). Appointed by President Eisenhower, Justice Harlan served on the Court
from 1955 to 1971.
11. FINLEY P. DUNNE, MR. DOOLEY ON THE CHOICE OF LAW 52
Bander ed., 1963).

(Edward J.
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votes for conservative majorities during the last term, as they have in
previous terms. But significantly, both have shown a reluctance to take
the Court as far to the right as their more conservative brethren.
Before I begin to discuss the Court's decisions, I want to make clear
that neither my book, nor this lecture, is meant to provide a definitive
study of the Rehnquist Court which, of course, is still in session. Instead,
I will focus on key decisions in four areas of civil rights and
liberties-racial discrimination, abortion, criminal procedure, and First
Amendment freedoms. These decisions, to a significant degree, have
determined the Court's philosophical direction. I should add that in many
of the cases discussed I was' fortunate to have been given extraordinary
access to internal Court sources that illuminated the Justices' deliberative
process.
"The Year the Court Turned Right," was the New York Times
headline above the story at the end of the Supreme Court's term that
included a series of rulings rejecting the claims of civil rights and liberties
litigants. While you might assume that article ran four months ago, in
fact, it ran in July of 1989.12 The headline appeared to sum up the
Court's rulings that term when the Justices rejected a black woman's claim
of racial harassment in the work place,' 3 struck down Richmond's
affirmative action program in the construction industry,' 4 and served
notice that at least a plurality of the Court considered Roe v. Wade 5 to
be fatally flawed.' 6 The Court's four most conservative members,
speaking through the dissent of the Court's newest member, Justice
Anthony Kennedy, moreover, suggested that Jefferson's metaphorical wall
of separation between church and state was outmoded and that serious
revision of the modern Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence might
well be imminent. 7
A few months after those decisions had been announced, I began to
explore the possibility of doing a book on what I presumed would be a
successful conservative judicial revolution. The apparent success of the
conservative majority during the previous term, though only by the
12. Linda Greenhouse, The Year the CourtTurnedRight, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 1989,
at Al, A10 (describing the 1989 Supreme Court term as one controlled by a conservative

majority on important issues including abortion, the death penalty, race and sex
discrimination, and the immunity of state and local governments from lawsuits by their
citizens).
13. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
14. City of Richmond v. J.H. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
15. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
16. Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
17. See Allegheny County v. ACLU of Greater Pittsburgh, 492 U.S. 573, 656
(1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

[V/ol. 40

narrowest five-vote margin in most cases, seemed only the beginning.
After all, the Court was now led by Chief Justice William Rehnquist, the
first conservative ideologue to preside over the modern Supreme Court.
And Rehuquist appeared to have a working majority in most civil rights
and liberties cases, as the past term had demonstrated.
The year 1989 also marked the end of a decade in which American
politics had taken a sharp turn to the right. By that time, conservative
Republican presidents had appointed eight consecutive members to the
Supreme Court. It seemed, therefore, that I could confidently develop my
thesis-that a conservative judicial revolution was in progress.
But almost immediately after I began my research and interviews on
the Court's internal decision-making process, doubts arose in my mind
about my thesis. It was true, for example, as the New York Times and
other members of the media had reported, that in the decision of Patterson
v. McLean Credit Union 8 a five member conservative majority had
rejected the civil rights claim of racial harassment by the plaintiff, Brenda
Patterson, and that the Court's opinion, written by Justice Kennedy, had
given the Civil Rights Act of 1866 an exceedingly narrow
interpretation. 9 But as I dug into the internal Court documents in the
Patterson case, I discovered that Kennedy, who wrote the majority
opinion, had originally supported the position of the Court's leading
liberal, Justice Brennan.'
Late in the term, Kennedy switched his
position and vote to produce the conservative victory.
The solid
conservative majority reported in the media was not so solid after all.
I discovered, further, that the Chief Justice had been frustrated in
what liberals on the Court privately considered Rehnquist's larger
purpose: to overrule the critical civil rights precedent, Runyon v.
McCrary,2 which had provided protection under the 1866 Civil Rights
Act against private employment discrimination. If Runyon had been
overruled, it would have truly signaled a revolutionary conservative
movement. But that did not happen.'
18. 491 U.S. 164 (1988).
19. See Patterson, 491 U.S. at 171 (holding that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 bars
racial discrimination in hiring individuals but does not race-based harassment while onthe-job).
20. See SIMON supra note 1, at 19-81.
21. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
22. See SIMON, supra note 1, at 47 (stating that "[w]hen the final votes were tallied,
even the chief justice had backed away from insisting on an outright reversal of Runyon.
A unanimous court ... reaffirmed the Court's holding in Runyon v. McCrary.").
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No one, however, could doubt the Chief Justice's triumph in Webster
v. Reproductive Health Services,'8 the 1989 decision in which a fivemember majority upheld a series of Missouri statutory restrictions on a
woman's constitutional right to have an abortion.24 The Chief Justice's
plurality opinion unleashed a savage attack on Justice Blackmun's analysis
in Roe v. Wade.' The Rehnquist attack on Roe had prompted one of
Webster's dissenters, Justice Stevens, to write Rehnquist privately (after
he had received Rehnquist's first draft). If Rehnquist intended to overrule
Roe (as Stevens thought that he did), Stevens wrote that he "would rather
see the Court give the case a decent burial instead of tossing it out the
window of a fast-moving caboose."6
As it turned out, the Chief's main problem in Webster was not with
Justice Stevens, a dissenter, but with Justice O'Connor, the critical fifth
member of his majority that had voted to uphold the Missouri regulations.
O'Connor simply refused to join that part of Rehnquist's opinion attacking
Roe. And this refusal sent the Chief's ally, Justice Scalia, into paroxysms
of rage against O'Connor's restraint, which Scalia ridiculed in his Webster
concurrence. 2 The split between O'Connor and Scalia in Webster was
deep and would have profound repercussions in the next direct challenge
to Roe three years later, PlannedParenthoodof Southeastern Pennsylvania
v. Casey.28
On First Amendment issues, the Court sent mixed constitutional
messages in 1989. In Texas v. Johnson,29 a five-member majority led by
Justice Brennan struck down a Texas statute that had penalized the burning
of the American flag as a violation of the First Amendment's protection
of political speech. The decision, however, contained several surprising
ideological crossovers. Justices Kennedy and Scalia joined Brennan's
majority opinion, and Justice Stevens, usually aligned with liberals in civil
23. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
24. See SIMON, supra note 1, at 127-43 (discussing the Webster decision).
25. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). In Webster, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote:
The rigid Roe framework is hardly consistent with the notion of a constitution
cast, in general terms, as ours is, and usually speaking in general terms, as
ours does. The key elements of the Roe framework-trimesters and viabilityare not found in the text of the Constitution or in any place else one would
expect to find a Constitutional principle.
Id. at 518.
26. SIMON, supra note 1, at 135-36 (quoting Justice Stevens).
27. Webster, 492 U.S. at 532 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Justice O'Connor's assertion,
that a 'fundamental rule of judicial restraint' requires us to avoid reconsidering Roe
cannot be taken seriously."); see also SIMON, supra note 1, at 137.
28. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
29. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
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liberties cases, dissented as did, more predictably, Chief Justice
Rehnquist.
In the Court's most important Establishment Clause case that term,
Allegheny County v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU,3" a narrow majority
declared that a creche displayed in the Allegheny County, Pennsylvania
courthouse violated the First Amendment. At the same time the Court
upheld another government-sponsored holiday display which included a
Christmas tree and a menorah. In his dissent to the creche portion of the
majority's decision, Justice Kennedy complained bitterly about the
majority's failure to follow Chief Justice Burger's Establishment Clause
analysis in a 1984 decision, Lynch v. Donnelly,3 in which the Court had
declared that a government-sponsored creche display on private property
was constitutional. In Lynch, Burger had dismissed Jefferson's wall of
separation metaphor as "a useful figure of speech" but "not a wholly
accurate description of the practical aspects of the relationship that in fact
exists between church and state."32 In his Allegheny County dissent,
Kennedy suggested that the debate among the Justices of the Rehnquist
Court as to the appropriate Establishment Clause doctrine to apply was far
from over.33
During the following terms, the Rehnquist Court continued to move
34
unevenly in its civil rights and liberties decisions. In U.S. v. Fordice,
the Court refused to distinguish colleges and universities from primary and
secondary schools in holding that the state college and university system
of Mississippi had the same affirmative obligation to dismantle its dual
system that the state's primary and secondary public schools had under
Green v. County School Board.'
But later, a five-member majority
pointedly questioned North Carolina's attempt at redistricting along racial
lines that would have given African-Americans representation in Congress
more in line with their actual state population. 36
In the criminal procedure area, the Court majority issued a series of
unmistakably pro-prosecution rulings that, among other things, narrowed
the opportunity for death row inmates to successfully appeal their
convictions in federal courts in habeas corpus petitions and, more
30. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
31. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
32. Id. at 673.
33. Allegheny County, 492 U.S. at 656 (Kennedy J., dissenting) (stating that
"[s]ubstantial revision of our Establishment Clause doctrine may be in order, but it is
unnecessary to undertake that task today"); see also SIMON, supra note 1, at 256.
34. 505 U.S. 717 (1992).
35. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
36. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
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generally, expanded police and prosecutors' authority.37 In one decision,
Arizona v. Fulminante,38 the Court reversed its long-standing doctrine
insisting that a coerced confession could never be "harmless error" and,
therefore, was always grounds for the reversal of a conviction.3 9 At the
same time, the majority said that the coerced confession by Fulminante
was not "harmless error" and so the defendant would have to be tried
again and convicted on other evidence.'
All the while, the Warren
Court's most controversial criminal procedure decisions, such as Mapp v.
Ohio1 and Miranda v. Arizona,42 remained on the books and did not
appear to be in peril.
The same five-member majority that struck down Texas's flag-burning
statute in 1989 again found a First Amendment violation in 1990 when a
federal flag-burning statute was at issue. 3 But in another civil liberties
area, the constitutional right to privacy, the Court upheld abortion
restrictions in Minnesota and Ohio, and appeared to be preparing to
overrule Roe.'
By 1992, the Court's most liberal members, Brennan and Marshall,
had been replaced by President Bush's two appointees, David Souter and
Clarence Thomas, the ninth and tenth successive Justices appointed by
conservative Republican presidents. The numbers alone suggested that
Chief Justice Rehnquist would succeed in his judicial revolution to uproot
basic civil rights and liberties decisions of the past thirty years.
After the Court's Webster decision, it had generally been assumed that
the Court would eventually overrule Roe, and Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey4' appeared to provide the Rehnquist
Court with that opportunity. The retirement of Brennan and Marshall
37. See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (life imprisonment
without parole or consideration of mitigating factors not violative of Eighth Amendment);
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) (denying writ of habeas corpus); Florida

v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991) (random consensual searches not per se
unconstitutional); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989) (capital punishment); Penry
v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (execution of mentally retarded persons convicted of
capital offenses not catagorically prohibited by Eighth Amendment).
38. 499 U.S. 279 (1991).
39. Id. at 285.
40. Id. at 302.
41. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
42. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
43. United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990).
44. See Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990); Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for
Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990).
45. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
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meant that only one member of the original majority in Roe v. Wade,
Harry Blackmun, would hear Casey, the 1992 challenge to Roe.
But as we now know, the joint opinion by Justices Kennedy,
O'Connor and Souter in Casey preserved Roe and a woman's
constitutional right to control her own body, though O'Connor's "undue
burden" standard applied in Casey would allow more state regulations of
abortion than under Roe's analysis.'
In exploring the internal dynamic of Casey, I came to realize just how
extraordinary the joint opinion by O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter was.
At the Justices's Casey conference seven members of the Court voted to
uphold most of Pennsylvania's restrictions on abortion.47 Originally, the
Chief Justice had assigned himself the majority opinion which, it was
assumed, would be written along the lines of his Webster plurality.48
Since Roe, Rehnquist had contended that so long as a state regulation of
abortion was reasonable, it was constitutional. It was this rational basis
standard that Justice Stevens had attacked privately in a letter to the Chief
after he had received Rehnquist's Webster draft. Stevens wrote: "If a
simple showing that a state regulation 'reasonably furthers the state
interest in protecting potential human life' is enough to justify an abortion
regulation, the woman's interest in making the abortion decision
apparently is given no weight at all. "' Stevens suggested further that
"[a] tax on abortions, a requirement that the pregnant woman must be able
to stand on her head for fifteen minutes before she can have an abortion,
or a criminal prohibition would each satisfy your test. "50
There is no reason to doubt that Rehnquist in Casey intended to finish
the demolition job on Roe that he had started in Webster. But as it
developed, Kennedy, O'Connor and Souter had other ideas. Unknown to
the Chief Justice or any other member of the Court, the three Justices took
it upon themselves in a private meeting after the Justices's conference to
write a separate joint opinion. 5 As a result, they snatched the Court's
46. See id. at 2821. The joint opinion stated that:
[t]o protect the central right recognized in Roe while at the same time

accommodating the State's profound interest in potential life, we will employ
the undue burden analysis ....
An undue burden exists, and therefore a
provision of law is invalid, if its purpose or effect is to place substantial

obstacles in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains
viability.

Id.
47. See

SIMON,

supra note 1, at 163-67.

48. Id. at 163.
49. Id. at 135 (quoting Justice Stevens).

50. Id.
51. Id. at 163-66.
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opinion away from the Chief and preserved the essential holding of
Roe.52
The joint opinion by Kennedy, O'Connor, and Souter included these
words:
A decision to overrule Roe's essential holding under the existing
circumstances would address error, if error there was, at the cost
of both profound and unnecessary damage to the Court's
legitimacy, and to the Nation's commitment to the rule of law.
It is therefore imperative to adhere to the essence of Roe's
original decision, and we do so today. 3
If the Casey decision produced a more conservative result than Roe's
author, Justice Blackmun, would have wished, it, nonetheless, showed that
the three pivotal Justices, Kennedy, O'Connor and Souter, were no
revolutionaries.
During the same term that Casey was decided, the authors of the
Casey joint opinion were joined by the Court's two most liberal members,
Blackmun and Stevens, in Lee v. Weisman, 4 a decision striking down a
Providence, Rhode Island middle school commencement prayer as a
violation of the First Amendment's Establishment Clause. Justice
Kennedy, who had written the 1989 Allegheny dissent that had been so
critical of Blackmun's Establishment Clause analysis, now joined
Blackmun and wrote for a five-member majority. In his opinion for the
Court, Kennedy quoted Madison on the dangers of government support for
religion,5" and cited approvingly the Warren Court's controversial 1962
decision, Engel v. Vitale, 6 which had struck down New York's Regent's
Prayer as a violation of the Establishment Clause.
In Lee, Kennedy
emphasized continuity with the Court's past decisions, as he had done in
the joint opinion in Casey that same term.5
52. Id.; see also Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791,
2811-16 (1992) (reaffirming the essential holding of Roe).
53. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2816.
54. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).

55. Id. at 2657.
56. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
57. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2657 (1992) (citing Engel v. Vitale, 370
U.S. 421, 425 (1962)).
58. Id. at 2657-58; see also Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2814-16.
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The first three words of the New York Times's 1991 term wrap-up
story read "The Center Held."" The newspaper's fine Supreme Court
reporter, Linda Greenhouse, wrote that the centrist coalition of Kennedy,
O'Connor and Souter were primarily responsible for "the story of this
surprising and fascinating Supreme Court term, a term that appeared only
months ago to have all the makings of a conservative counterrevolution
but that in the end produced powerful, if qualified, reaffirmations of some
of the Court's most important modern precedents."'
The next two terms were relatively quiet, with no radical shifts
revealed in the Court's civil rights and liberties decisions in the areas that
had been the focus of my book. When my book went to press in the early
spring of this year, I was confident that I had backed up my revised
thesis-that there had been no conservative judicial revolution and that
there was an effective center on the Rehnquist Court-with documentation
that covered the eight terms that Rehnquist had presided as Chief Justice.
Last June, the Court issued a series of civil rights and liberties
decisions that appeared to call into question the title of my book and its
conclusion. On July 2, 1995, the New York Times's headline for the story
about the Court's term read: "Farewell to the Old Order in the Court: The
Right Goes Activist and the Center Is a Void." 61 The accompanying
story pointed to a series of decisions, including the Court's ruling that
political redistricting plans based on race were presumptively
unconstitutional, and that federal affirmative action programs would have
to satisfy the highest constitutional standard of strict scrutiny.62 Further,
the Court ruled that state universities could not discriminate against
student religious publications by denying funding for printing expenses
that was available to non-religious publications.'
The first noteworthy fact about all three of those 1995 civil rights and
liberties decisions was that the conservative victory was accomplished by
the narrowest majority of five Justices, including Kennedy and O'Connor,
who still hold the balance of power on this Court, as they have since
Kennedy took his seat in 1988. If you look closely at O'Connor's
opinions, moreover, you will find that she has taken significantly more
59. Linda Greenhouse, Slim Margin Moderates On Court Defy Predictions, N.Y.
TIMEs, July 5, 1992, § 4, at 1.
60. Id.
61. Linda Greenhouse, Farewell to the Old Order in the Court: The Right Goes
Activist and the Center Is a Void, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1995, § 4, at 1.
62. Id.; see also Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995) (applying strict scrutiny
to a challenge of redistricting legislation); Adarand Constructors, Inc., v. Pena, 115 S.
Ct. 2097 (1995) (applying strict scrutiny to a challenge of a federal program issuing

highway contracts to minority-owned businesses).

63. Rosenbergerv. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995).
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moderate positions in all of the cases than those of her more conservative
colleagues. In her concurrence in the redistricting decision, Miller v.
Johnson,' for example, O'Connor made the point that "customary and
traditional" factors could legitimately be taken into consideration in
redistricting as well as could race.' How she will parse the facts and
constitutional issues raised in this term's redistricting challenges from
Texis' and North Carolina67 is, I think, impossible to know. And just
where O'Connor comes out in these redistricting cases will determine the
prevailing constitutional law on the issue.
In Adarand Constructors v. Pefia,l the 1995 federal affirmative
action decision, O'Connor took a noticeably more moderate position than
the more ideologically-committed conservative, Justice Scalia. Scalia
wrote in his Adarand concurrence that it was his view that "government
can never have a 'compelling interest' in discriminating on the basis of
race in order to 'make up' for past racial discrimination.'69 That is not
O'Connor's position. In Adarand she cited approvingly Justice Powell's
opinion in the Burger Court's Regents of University of California v.
Bakke7 decision for the proposition that there can be governmentsponsored affirmative action programs that meet the Court's strict scrutiny
And strict in theory does not, in O'Connor's view,
standard.7"
necessarily mean fatal in fact.'
Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors
of the University of Virginia' suggested that the Court's ruling in favor
of university funding of printing expenses for student religious publications
should be confined narrowly to the facts in that case. She concluded that
in the context of Rosenberger "[it is] improbable [that there will be] any
perception of government endorsement of the religious message. " '
64. 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995).

65. Id. at 2497 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
66. See Vera v. Richards, 861 F. Supp. 1304 (S.D.Tex. 1994), prob. juris. noted
sub nom. Bush v. Vera, 115 S. Ct. 2639 (1995) (action for injunctive and declaratory
relief from Texas redistricting plan).
67. See Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. 408 (E.D. N.C. 1994), prob.juris. noted, 115
S. Ct. 2639 (1995) (action challenging constitutionality of North Carolina's redistricting
plan).
68. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
69. Id. at 2118 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
70. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
71. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2108-09.
72. Id. at 2117.
73. 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995).

74. Id. at 2527 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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Again, it seems clear that O'Connor is striking a noticeably more
moderate chord than the more conservative members of the Court
majority.
Stuart Taylor Jr., a former Supreme Court correspondent for the New
York Times and now a senior writer for The American Lawyer and
columnist for Legal Times, noted in a recent Legal Times column that
much of the commentary about the Court's past term implies that
O'Connor and Kennedy have gone over to the hard right. 5 Taylor
disagreed, writing that "neither of them have budged an inch from where
they have long been."7 6 He noted that O'Connor's opinion in Adarand
is "quite consistent with her previous opinions on racial preferences" and
that her concurrence in the Rosenbergercase "gave religious conservatives
far less than they wanted."'
Taking public opinion as his frame of reference for measuring the
Court's decisions, Taylor wrote, "The Court's current majority comes up
about in the center or even, in the cases of abortion and religion in the
schools, a bit to the left of center."78 "The bottom line," Taylor
concluded, "is that it's hard to think of a single big issue on which the
policy judgments implicit in the decisions of the Rehnquist Court are
clearly to the right of center, measured by public opinion. ""
Public opinion, of course, may move to the right. The Rehnquist
Court is more conservative than its predecessors, the Warren and Burger
Courts. To some extent, the Court may reflect the more conservative
political mood in the country today than the one that prevailed in the
sixties and seventies. This Court also reflects the values of seven
members of the current Court who were appointed by conservative
Republican presidents.
Why, then, hasn't the conservative judicial revolution succeeded? I
have no facile explanation, but I do have a few suggestions. First, the
votes of most members of the Rehnquist Court in any given civil rights
and liberties case are no more predictable than the votes of justices on
Courts that have preceded this one. Certainly there are appointees who
have fulfilled the expectations of the presidents who appointed them.
Chief Justice Rehnquist comes to mind, as do Justices Scalia and Thomas.
But for every predictable justice, there is usually one who confounds the
prognosticators. When he retired in 1994, Justice Blackmun, a Nixon
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appointee, was the Court's most liberal member. Justice Stevens,
appointed by Gerald Ford, has become increasingly liberal in civil rights
Justice Souter, Bush's first appointee, has
and liberties issues.
consistently taken forthright civil rights and liberties positions, voting
regularly with Stevens and President Clinton's two appointees, Ruth Bader
Ginsburg and Stephen Breyer.
This leaves Kennedy and O'Connor. Although both Kennedy's and
O'Connor's values are essentially conservative, they have frequently
resisted pressures from the right wing of the Court, namely Rehnquist,
Scalia and Thomas, to commit themselves to a resolute conservative
constitutional vision. As Stuart Taylor wrote: "The conservatives win
only when they get the votes of both of the justices in the Court's center,
Sandra Day O'Connor and Anthony Kennedy. And those votes almost
always come with a hedge."'4
In sum, the center of gravity on this Court is not located on the right
wing, where Rehnquist, Scalia and Thomas reside, but, instead, where
O'Connor and Kennedy sit. Their influence is reinforced by the Court's
internal decision-making process, which encourages compromise, at least
in close decisions. Kennedy and O'Connor have often used their strong
negotiating positions effectively when their votes have been needed for a
conservative majority.
In 1995, retired Justice Brennan's famous five-finger exercise is still
relevant. Early in a term, usually after one of Brennan's new law clerks
had raged over a hopelessly wrongheaded majority opinion by one of
Brennan's more conservative colleagues, Brennan would treat his incensed
clerk to his five-finger exercise. Raising his hand, Brennan would wiggle
his five fingers and say, "Five votes, five votes around here can do
anything." 8 ' But today the correlative proposition-less than five votes
can do very little-works in Kennedy's and O'Connor's favor.
Brennan is gone, but his lesson endures. It still takes five votes to
advance, or reverse, constitutional doctrine. And that is why the internal
struggle for the ideological soul of the Rehnquist Court is fierce but, by
no means, over.

80. Id. at S27.
81. SIMON, supra note 1, at 54 (quoting Justice Brennan).

